THE
CASE PRESENTED TO EGYPT
7 September 1956
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
Our discussions have been conducted in an atmosphere of courteous frankness
and responsibility. But they have, in our opinion, disclosed deep differences
of approach and principle which it seems clear that no repetition of debate
can affect. In these circumstances, we consider that it would now be helpful
that my Committee should set down, in summary and objective form, the underlying
purposes of the eighteen-power proposals and the nature of the reasons
underlying them. This seems desirable because, as our talks have been
conducted in private without records and with great informality, neither
you nor we would desire that there should be in future any misunderstanding
on the part of our principals or of yourself as to what we were proposing
to your Government.
We were authorized to present those proposals on behalf of the following eighteen
nations represented at the London Conference as follows (I put them into
alphabetical order): Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States of America. (Spain, at the London Conference,
made a reservation which has been conveyed to you.)
From the outset, you will have observed that the eighteen nations have not
attempted to arrive at any joint opinion as to the validity or otherwise
of Egypt's nationalization decree. The London Conference felt that to
have a debate on this point would be fruitless, since the Conference possessed
no authority to make any judicial determination. It was therefore considered
much more practical to work out constructive proposals which assumed that
the act of nationalization had occurred and that the problem of the payment
of compensation to the Suez Canal Company would be properly dealt with,
with provision for arbitration in the event of difference, and that what
was needed was the establishment of principles and methods for the future. These
should be such as would both in law and in fact ensure that the Suez Canal
would continue to be an international waterway operated free of politics
or national discrimination, and with a financial structure so secure and
an international confidence so high that an expanding and improving future
for the Canal could be guaranteed.
The proposals evolved in this atmosphere have been placed before you and have
been much debated between us. We have, as you know, gone beyond the mere
presentation of the proposals and have sought to explain and establish
what we believe to be the large questions of principle involved.
It would be tedious and unnecessary in this document to recapitulate all the
discussions that have occurred on all the points of interpretation that
have arisen. The simple truth is that we quite early realized on both
sides of the table that there were certain central matters without agreement
upon which subsidiary matters could not usefully be determined.
The two crucial proposals emerging from London were:
1. That the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the influence
of the politics of any nation; and
2. that, to enable this to be done, there should be established, under
an International Convention to which Egypt would
be a party, a body charged with the operation, maintenance, and development
of the Canal. Such a body, we propose, should be constituted of people
from various countries, including Egypt. The members would not be subject
to political direction, and should be given in the Convention, with the
free consent of Egypt, wide powers of management, and finance so that it
could inspire confidence, deal with the future financial requirements of
the Canal, and ensure a non-discriminatory and non-political management
of Canal traffic. The proposed body would naturally have due regard for
the laws and institutions of Egypt.
You have with complete frankness made it clear to us that the existence of
such a body operating the Suez Canal would, in the view of Egypt, be a
derogation from Egyptian sovereignty; that it would in substance represent
a reversal of the policy announced by you on 26 July. We cannot agree with
this view. Nowhere in our proposals is there any denial of Egypt's territorial
sovereignty. On the contrary, the London proposals expressly recognized
these rights in paragraph 2 of the resolution. The whole essence of what
we have put forward is (to use a homely illustration) that Egypt's position
as the landlord of the Canal being completely accepted, she should proceed
by international agreement to install a tenant so constituted that the
future of the Canal would be satisfactory both to its owners and to those
many nations who use it. We believe, as we have pointed out, that it cannot
seriously be maintained that when a landlord grants a lease of premises,
that lease derogates from his ownership. The fact is that the lease is
an expression of and conditional upon his ownership. On this analogy our
proposals would mean that the tenant of the Canal would pay to Egypt a
substantial rental which must unquestionably grow as the traffic through
the Canal increases, and that in the meantime the tenant would, in the
exercise of its managerial and financial powers, be constantly improving
the value of Egypt's asset. Indeed, as the 'tenant' in this analogy would
be a body which includes Egypt herself, the position of Egypt would be
even stronger.
In paragraph 3a of our proposals, there is a reference to 'institutional arrangements'. As
we felt that this phrase might be regarded as admitting of a variety of
applications, we undertook the task of illustrating what it meant. We
pointed out that what we were saying was merely illustrative and was not
designed to narrow the broad significance of the proposals themselves. But,
as we have said, one form of 'institutional arrangement' which comes readily
to mind is to be seen by reference to the case of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. That bank was created by agreement
among a considerable number of nations. It was not incorporated under
the law of any one country. It owes its existence to the agreement of
many countries. Its powers are defined by an international document. Without
being in the technical sense incorporated under some pre-existing law it
has, in fact, by its articles, wide powers of borrowing and lending, and
banking generally. The International Bank succeeds in its purpose, not
only because it has extensive powers, but also because in its capital structure
and growth it has enjoyed the unquestioned confidence of a great variety
of member nations. Its existence has not so far as we know been regarded
as derogating from the sovereignty of any nation, even though it enjoys
a wide immunity from national laws.
We have become conscious of your firmly held view that there is no occasion
for a canal authority possessing an international character, because of
your Excellency's belief that Egypt is herself capable of conducting and ensuring
the future of the Canal, and has never challenged the 1888 Convention or
its declarations about the freedom of the Canal.
To answer this point, we found it necessary to put before you quite frankly
and objectively certain considerations which, from the point of view of
the eighteen nations we represent, nations who among them represent over
ninety percent of the traffic passing through the Canal, are of vital significance. The
traffic through the Canal has almost reached what might be described as
saturation point. Even to maintain it in its present shape requires the
constant services of a highly skilled, experienced, and specialized engineering
and transportation staff. This staff has been built up over a long period
of years. There has been an increasing intake of Egyptian personnel, but
the great majority of the key employees are still nationals of other countries. From
the point of view of Egypt herself it is desirable that there is complete
mutual confidence among those actually operating the Canal, the Government
of Egypt, and the users of the Canal.
But the matter does not end there. It is clear that as a result of increased
traffic Egypt can enjoy very substantial and increasing benefits from the
Canal if the Canal can retain the confidence of its principal users. The
number of tankers passing through the Canal could double or treble in a
few years if such confidence exists. To deal with such traffic, expansion
of the Canal will be necessary. Whether expansion consists of widening,
deepening, constructing by-passes or even duplicating the Canal, the capital
costs will be substantial. If these costs are to be met over a period
of time from Canal revenues without serious current reductions in Egypt's
income from the Canal or without the imposition of burdensome increases
of dues, they must be derived from funds accruing from an increase in traffic
- an increase which would come only if the users would maintain confidence
in the Canal - and it must be remembered that increased dues would impose
grievous burdens upon those many millions of people in the world who, in
the long run, pay the costs and charges incurred by the cargoes they ultimately
buy or sell. If expansion should not be necessary, it would be because
the users' confidence would be lacking and many of them would have found
ways to avoid remaining dependent on the Canal. The benefit, therefore,
which Egypt might have gained would
be materially lessened.
We have, therefore, in the interest of Egypt and the users urged that the structure
of the body actually conducting the Canal operations should be such as
to inspire world-wide confidence and bring about a capacity to raise the
necessary capital sums because of a prevailing feeling of security on the
parts of those who may be asked to provide them.
In short, what we have proposed is that, Egypt's sovereignty being fully recognized,
the actual operation, maintenance, and expansion of the Canal should be
reposed in a body (established under international convention), which would
include people from various nations, including of course Egypt, with extensive
financial powers and responsibilities. As we believe that an international
waterway like the Suez Canal should not become an instrument of the political
policy of any nation or nations, we proposed that the members of this body
should not be the mere delegates of any nation or be under any obligation
to observe political instructions. On the contrary, we proposed that the
parties to the convention should select them with regard to their personal
qualities of ability, integrity, and experience. It is true in a sense
that our proposed convention would be an arrangement made between governments
and that original appointments to the proposed authority would be made
by governments. But we firmly believe that, with good will and good faith,
persons so appointed could serve in a non-political manner in this case
as readily, for instance, as do the judges of the Permanent Court of International
Justice.
As we have throughout emphasized, it is essential that if it is to be a truly
international waterway as envisaged by the 1888 Convention, there should
be no politics in the Suez Canal, whether those of Egypt or of any other
nation.
Your Excellency has told us with clarity and frankness that you do not believe
that the Canal could be excluded from the politics of Egypt, since it is
part of Egyptian territory and assets. To this we have pointed out that,
if the Canal is to remain fully available for any of Egypt's political
purposes, subject only to the 1888 Convention, then the many nations using
the Canal will have to realize that their pattern of overseas trade will
be at any time subject to the decision of Egypt alone. We are, of course,
conscious of your own view that these considerations are adequately met
by the guarantee of freedom under the 1888 Convention. But if that Convention
is to contain the only limitation, it seems clear to us, as we have pointed
out, that there could be, for political purposes, many discriminations
in traffic and marshalling control which did not fall foul of the Convention;
that, Canal dues being within Egypt's sole control, differences of opinion
as to their level will almost inevitably be fixed by reference to Egyptian
budgetary needs with the strong possibility that they would be raised to
the maximum that the traffic could bear; and that future development of
the Canal might well be controlled by local budget considerations, a danger
which independent finance by a special international body would entirely
avert.
We have stated and restated that the setting up of such a body as we have proposed
would create such a feeling of assurance in the minds of all user nations
that the necessary financial provision could be secured, the burden of
such matters being no longer the sole responsibility of Egypt herself. We
have further emphasized that, under our proposals, there would no longer
be private shareholders or dividends. The one nation which would obtain
an assured annual net revenue from the Canal would be Egypt.
Your Excellency has repeatedly and vigorously explained to us that the setting
up of a Suez Canal body of the kind envisaged in our proposals would, to
the eyes of Egypt, represent either foreign domination or seizure. We
have pointed out that the truth is that no arrangement for the tenancy
of the Canal can be either domination or seizure if it is freely agreed
to by Egypt. And it is, as you know, that willing and free agreement which
all of our negotiations have been designed to secure.
It remains only to emphasize two other large matters which arise in the course
of our proposals.
The first was our proposal that the new body, having been constructed by international
convention, should be brought into relationship with the United Nations. This
was done in the case of the International Bank by an agreement with the
United Nations which had the effect of making the bank a 'specialized agency'
under the Charter but which, of course, did not affect the freedom of
the bank in the conduct of its business. Association between our proposed
body and the United Nations in a similar fashion could, we believe, give
great satisfaction all around the world and, if adopted, would considerably
strengthen international confidence and security.
We also proposed an Arbitral Commission to settle disputes. There might be
disputes as to the equitable return which Egypt should have from the Canal. There
might, in the course of the years, be other disputes involving one or more
of the constituent nations. Any such matters, if they could not be resolved
by agreement, should be arbitrated upon by an independent commission enjoying
international confidence. Our proposal did not mean that such an Arbitral
Commission would be the authority to deal with the normal problems which
arise in the course of management, such as claims which might arise in
relation to the employment of people or contracts with subsidiary contractors. To
the extent to which contracts might be entered into in respect of such
normal matters, they would be contracts made, for the most part, in Egypt
and we did not contemplate that in respect of such matters the normal jurisdiction
of the Egyptian courts should be excluded. It would be only in any dispute
of a genuinely international character that the jurisdiction of the Arbitral
Commission would be invoked.
At the London Conference, it was agreed by all the nations represented that
any arrangement entered into must be completely fair to Egypt and must
pay scrupulous regard to Egypt's territorial sovereignty. Our whole presentation
of the matter to Your Excellency has been made in that spirit and with
that desire. It is for this reason that we have repeatedly pointed out
that, while representing nations who are users of the Canal, we are deeply
and urgently concerned in obtaining the highest possible measure of confidence
and an effective and practical guaranteed freedom and future for the Canal. There
are in our proposals marked advantages for Egypt which we have discussed at length but which
we now summarize as follows:
(a) Egypt's
ownership of the Canal being recognized, it is to her great advantage to
have the Canal maintained and improved and made more profitable as the
years go on;
(b) the future
financial burdens involved in such maintenance and improvement would be
carried and handled by the new body and therefore Egypt would
in fact be relieved of them;
(c) Egypt
alone would draw profit from the Canal;
(d) a just
and fair method of compensating the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company
would have to be agreed upon;
(e) the dangerous
tension now existing internationally would be relaced on terms satisfactory
to the user nations and entirely consistent with Egypt's
proper dignity, independence and ownership, and thus a world contribution
would be made to the peaceful settlement of international problems.
It is the understanding of the Committee that you have taken the position that
you are unable to accept the basic proposals put before you. I would be
grateful if Your Excellency would inform the Committee whether or not its
understanding is correct, supplementing your statement with such views
as you may care to express. If, unfortunately, the understanding of the
Committee is correct, the task entrusted to the Committee by the eighteen
powers of presenting and explaining these proposals and ascertaining the
attitude of the Egyptian Government with respect to them would have been
carried out. In such an event, there would appear to be no alternative
other than for the Committee to request Your Excellency to receive it at
your earliest convenience so that it may be prepared, after a final conversation
with you, to take its leave.
I
am, Sir,
Yours
sincerely.
(Signed)
R. G. MENZIES
His Excellency,
Gamul Abdul Nasser,
President of the Republic of Egypt.