THE EVER CHANGING COMMONWEALTH
From The
Times, 11 and 12 June 1956
When I was a schoolboy, I read,
learned, and inwardly digested a British history which ended, forty years
before, in 1867. This created
in me an idea (still prevalent in many minds) that history is something written
about the past. It has taken
a concentrated adult experience to teach me that history is always in the
making, that Winston Churchill probably made more history than he has ever
written and that, in fact, we have in the last forty years lived with more
revolutions than the world produced in its previous three hundred years.
What we call the British Empire, with pride and without apology forty years ago, has
had its full share of changing history. Its changes, as I will seek to show,
have been much more than those of name. With
the decline of the Imperial idea (a topic to which I shall return) 'Colonialism' has
come under attack. This process
has, for me, some curious aspects. I would have thought it clear, in the
case Great Britain at least, that the establishment of a Colonial Empire
was one of its great contributions in the nineteenth century to the material
expansion of the world.The
growth through Colonialism to self-government, a self-government carrying
with it the great and peculiar British elements of responsible government
and the supremacy of the law, makes an inspiring record. In
short, though it might be the fashion to accuse Colonialism of being disreputable,
it must be conceded by at least half a dozen new nations that it has had
most legitimate children.
It
may be, of course, that the word 'colonialism' is today used as describing
European domination of non-European countries of people against their will. To the extent that this is a definition
of the term, no British person will argue about it, since the development
of self-government in accordance with the will of the Colonial peoples has
always been our ultimate goal. However,
I offer a mild warning against a too-ready acceptance of slogans. As one who was born in the Colony of
Victoria and who has lived to be the Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, I feel no urge to denounce our 'colonial' days or to
express pious regret for the British peoples having been, between them all,
a great Imperial Power.
So far this reads like a sort
of sentimental prologue. I now
want to put and endeavour to answer three questions.
(1) What was the nature of the 'old' Commonwealth?
(2) What is the nature of the present Commonwealth?
(3) What of the future?
My
readers may, on the threshold, challenge the use of the expression 'old' Commonwealth. 'Why,' they may say, 'the expression "Commonwealth" came
into use only thirty years ago in the Balfour formula. Surely in the face of history, here is
still something new.'
But even a brief consideration
will show that the Balfour Commonwealth has, in a few years, changed in such vital particulars
that it is now outmoded and must be described as 'old'. The
1926 formula, when it defined the status of the Dominions as that of 'autonomous
communities', 'in now way subordinate one to another', also used three expressions
of great cohesive significance. They
were - 'within the British Empire', 'a common allegiance
to the Crown', and ' British Commonwealth of Nations'.
To put it another way, the formula,
having established to the satisfaction of the individual British nations
that their juristic independence was unchallenged and unchallengeable, went
on, in the spirit of sturdy realism, to dwell on the matters which held those
independent nations together. What
did these uniting phrases mean? Clearly they did not mean that the British
Empire had come to an end; they meant that, at the hard core of that Empire,
there was a group of self-governing nations, freely associated but structurally
bonded together by a common allegiance to a common Crown. In
brief, the whole design possessed an integral character. It was not envisaged as a loose and friendly
but purely functional association. The notion of the Crown and a common
allegiance ran through it like a rod of steel, creating unity out of diversity. The
Sovereign was the head of each member State for all purposes, internal and external. In
a sentence, the then 'new' Commonwealth of the 1926 formula was a 'Crown' Commonwealth,
through and through.
Whether it was wise to try to
reduce the tacit and instinctive to explicit terms is a matter for debate. I know that the creation of a formula
is now regarded as the essence of statesmanship. Yet the whole historical genius of our
race is against it. The draftsmen
of the Code Napoleon were intellectually at the poles from the creators of
the English Common Law.
One
of the great current difficulties of creating a happy, mutual understanding
between the British and the other great Powers arises from the fact that
our intellectual tradition is inductive - trial,
error, trial, success, a precedent - so that we sometimes appear to the onlooker
to have no principles; while deductive minds elsewhere sometimes seem to
us to be so occupied by pure syllogisms that common sense and human values
seem to disappear. Perhaps it
was because of our instinctive reluctance to write things down that the Balfour
formula, which seemed in the first enthusiasm to solve everything, ended
up by leaving most things unsolved.
If, for example, there was one
common Crown to which a common allegiance was owed, and the Crown made peace
or war, could there be, in a British war, a neutral British nation? I never could see it myself, though the
opposite view was not uncommonly held by highly competent authorities. I always found the idea of neutrality
quite puzzling. Could the Crown
be at one and the same time at peace and at war with one foreign nation? Could the British
Commonwealth survive the stresses and strains of completely independent Dominion
foreign policies?
To take the matter further,
could you have utter and unqualified independence in a world in which the
interdependence of friendly powers is their only guarantee for the future? How far did independence extend under
the Balfour formula? If the
member-States of the British Commonwealth were to be equal in all things,
did not this mean that each might legislate for the succession of the Crown
differently, so that the Crown would cease to be 'common' and what had been
a common allegiance to it divided and destroyed? In the result, the answers to those questions
have to an extent been avoided by those later developments which, as I will
endeavour to show, have outmoded the 'old' Commonwealth in a few brief decades.
We now have a Commonwealth divided
in structure though still associated in function. It demands study and understanding. Some of the changes have arisen by formula,
others by the far-reaching wear and tear of modern circumstances. One of the great psychological factors
has been that the word 'Empire' has, in itself, lost its respectability. There is still an Empire, but one must
not speak about it. This strange
fact represents one of the remarkable paradoxes of our times. For the truth is that the Communist Powers,
while practising aggressive Imperialism on the grand scale and with astonishing
success, have in non-Communist and free countries succeeded in making peaceful
Imperialism disreputable. But
the greatest changes that have occurred to produce the new Commonwealth have
been in the structural significance of the Crown, which means, in effect,
the structural existence of the Commonwealth.
What
do I mean by the 'structural' significance
of the Crown, a significance of such overwhelming importance between 1926
and the Indian Republic formula of 1948? I will illustrate it by reference to
my own country. The Crown was
and, I am happy to say, is an essential ingredient in Australian Government
and life. Our Acts of Parliament
are made by 'The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate and the House
of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia'; the Governor-General
is the Queen's personal representative; the Queen's writs issue from our
Courts; I am Her Majesty's Prime Minister of Australia; Dr Evatt is the Leader
of Her Majesty's Opposition.
Up to 1948, this was true in
every member nation of the Commonwealth. It
was a Crown Commonwealth. The Sovereign was the head of the State
for all purposes, external and internal; the great 'common' element of unity. The
subjecthood of the individual citizen, whether Indian, Canadian, or Australian,
did not connote subservience or any derogation from liberty, but was, in
fact, a proud guarantee that individual liberties to choose, speak, share
in Government, would be sustained by a common membership of a great association
of free peoples, all of the 'the King's men'. True,
we were also held together
by common interests, in some cases by common race, in many cases by a common
intellectual and spiritual inheritance. But all these things we had and have
in common with some great nations outside the Commonwealth. It was the Crown, our relation to it,
our high feelings about it, its legal significance
going so far beyond the mere techniques of the law, which gave its special
character to the British Commonwealth which Balfour and
his associates set out to define thirty years ago.
The year 1948 saw a momentous
change.
India became a republic,
but remained a member of the Commonwealth. The Crown ceased to have significance
inside India; for external
purposes India recognized the King as 'the head of the
Commonwealth'. Clearly the 'new' Commonwealth
had emerged. Superficially,
it may look like the old one, but in reality we no longer have a Commonwealth
fully integrated on the basis of the Crown. Indeed, it might be more accurate to
say that we have now a Crown Commonwealth within a total Commonwealth. The
relations between Australia and Great
Britain, for example, and between
Australians and Her Majesty the Queen are precisely the same as they ever
were.
But the relations between India or Pakistan and the United Kingdom are different,
for the Crown has, for local purposes in those countries, disappeared. That
the Queen remains the head of the Commonwealth is no doubt important. But a new name for a new office doesn't
assure the continuance of the significance of the Crown. On the contrary, it draws sharp attention
to the fact that there is a world of difference between Australia's
relationship to the Throne and that of India.
During these last few years,
other things have occurred to hasten this fundamental change. I would, for example, find it an astonishing
thought that Australia or New Zealand should put forward
and practise a policy of neutrality. Yet, my friend Mr Nehru, speaking with
his unique knowledge of his own people and out of his great personal eminence,
has made it quite clear that for India neutrality has become almost an article
of faith.
There is no great point in all
this, except that the new Commonwealth is internally anomalous. What we have to do is not to dwell on
the anomalies, but to make the whole association work for the good of all.
It may, in other words, be retorted
that much of what I have written relates to rather academic matters of history;
and that the real business is the continuance of a working partnership between
the member nations of the Commonwealth. In substance, I agree with this; but
it is not useful to ignore the fact that you cannot convert a structural
association into a merely functional one without creating new tasks and developing
a new approach.
I will content myself with indicating
a few of the working problems which I believe are emerging in the new Commonwealth.
Take Defence. It is already an open secret that when
conferences of the Prime Ministers occur, defence talks do not take place
in full session, but are confined to those nations which in fact regard their
defence problems as joint and not merely several. In the past, for example, Pakistan has
participated, but India has not. The time may come when the field of Commonwealth
defence talks may become narrower, but it is surely clear that the fullest
mutual confidence in such discussions can be achieved only where it is thought
that there will be some assurance of active co-operation in the event of
war. Realities are already being
met.
Great Britain, Australia, and New
Zealand have common plans and have made common contributions
to the defence of Malaya. The S.E.A.T.O. arrangements are backed
by Pakistan but not
by India. In short, defence arrangements already
cease to have an over-all Commonwealth character, and are coming to be
selective and regional.
Similarly
with trade. Australia and New Zealand have been stalwart
champions of what used to be called 'Imperial preference'. But there is no reason to suppose our
traditional policies on those matters are supported by any of the new member
nations of the Commonwealth. In
these circumstances, we may not see another 'Ottawa' conference, nor can we reasonably expect to have any new multilateral
arrangements operating only inside the Commonwealth. Trade
agreements will inevitably be made bilaterally, the general limitations
upon any treaties arrived at being found in such broad international agreements
as G.A.T.T. instead of in some document or principle peculiar to the British Commonwealth.
In short, it is hard to think
of any great matter of international policy which will lend itself instantly,
as in the old days, to joint discussion among all the British countries designed
to produce a single joint conclusion. The
looser our arrangements among ourselves, the less likely we are to arrive
at joint policies.
Apart from old and lively friendships
and an honourable joint tradition, it may well be that the contacts between
Commonwealth countries will more and more come to depend upon periodical
meetings of Prime Ministers without agenda, bilateral trade talks, and periodical
meetings of Finance Ministers. Whether
such instruments can serve to continue something identifiable as the British
Commonwealth, with a powerful voice in world affairs, will depend very largely
on the importance which we attach to our contacts and the goodwill and resolution
which we bring to them. To put it in another way, the future
of the British Commonwealth is no longer a matter to
be decided by formulae or by generalized expressions. Everything will turn upon our means and
spirit of contact and consultation. There
will always be scope for a general conference, like that of Prime Ministers. But
on specific matters, I believe that more functional conferences, political
or official, will need to be the practice. Indeed
there may well be some problems in which limited or regional conferences
between selected British countries will need to occur.
In my own time, the machinery
of consultation has considerably improved. Practically
all the countries of the Commonwealth now exchange High Commissioners with
competent staffs. Conferences
are more frequent. And yet one
cannot be satisfied that our contacts are strong enough, or that consultation
always occurs at the right time. It may seem a small matter but I for
one believe that our post-war conferences on the Prime Ministerial level
have been much too hasty. When
Prime Ministers come from around the world, they should have abundant time
for easy, informal personal discussion. Why
we should all be the slaves of some inexorable air timetable, I do not understand. After
all, the less structure there is in our association, the more vital it becomes
that we should establish that degree of mutual knowledge and confidence which
alone can make a functional association effective. But
the matter goes further. Whitehall
is not the repository of all knowledge of the special interest of remote
British nations. Nor, may I
say, is the Commonwealth Relations Office the only United Kingdom Department
whose decisions may affect, say, Australia or New
Zealand.
I am no carping critic; but
I would courteously suggest that one text might be boldly printed in every
Department in London, New Delhi, Canberra, and the other Seats of Government - 'Will any decision I
am today contemplating affect some other nation of the Commonwealth? If
so, have I informed or consulted it?' There are other practical proposals which
are worth consideration if we are to give to our functional association some
of the strength of the old structure. The
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations ought to travel a lot, but
stay in office for a long time. There
is no Minister whose continuing knowledge and influence are more vital to
the Commonwealth. We need to
review our attitude (in some countries at least) to the work of the Commonwealth
Parliamentary Association. Its
periodical conferences are a wonderful vehicle for goodwill and understanding. It
would be good if we could all decide that
selection for such conferences should be concentrated upon Members who will
some day be leaders and Ministers.
I conclude by saying
that I for one believe that the time has come when, in the British
Commonwealth, we must give ourselves furiously to think about where we are
going and what road or roads we should take. Unless we are conscious of our mutual
problems and constantly working on them, we will, as they emerge, have little
more to contribute to their solution than a vague and wistful sentiment.